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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM ANDREWS, 
Petitioner-Appellant,: 
-vs-
LAWRENCE MORRIS, As Warden of 
the Utah State Prison, 
Respondent-Appellee, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from an order of the Third 
Judicial District Court, Hon. James S. Sawaya, dismissing 
Appellant's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, which 
claimed that Appellant was confined under a sentence of 
death imposed in violation of the Constitution of the 
United States. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Court below granted Respondent's Motion to 
Dismiss the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus without 
argument or a hearing, and denied Petitioner's Motion for 
a Stay of Execution pending a hearing on his Writ. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant weeks to have this Court reverse the 
District Court's order dismissing his Petition for a Writ 
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of Habeas Corpus without a hearing and to remand the case 
to the District Court for further proceedings in which 
Appellant would have the opportunity to present arguments 
and evidence in support of his constitutional claims, and 
to gra11L a stay of execution pending completion of those 
proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 2, 1978, the Supreme Court of the United 
States declined to review this Court's affirmance of the 
death sentence imposed on Appellant William Andrews. On 
November 3, 1978, the Second Judicial District Court of 
Utah entered an order resentencing Appellant to be 
executed on December 7, 1978. 
On November 16, 1978, a Petition for a Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, and an Application for Stay of Execution pending 
a hearing on that Petition, was filed on Appellant's 
behalf in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County. On November 24, 1978, Respondent filed a Motion 
to Dismiss that Petition. That motion was not received 
by counsel for Appellant until November 27, 1978--at the 
same time Appellant's counsel informed Respondent that 
Appellant would be filing an amended petition for habeas 
corpus. On November 28, 1978, that amended petition was 
filed and served. On November 29, 1978, both parties 
appeared before the Hon. James s. Sawaya for a hearing 
on Appellant's motion; at that time Respondent indicated 
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it had no objection to Appellant's filing of the Amended 
Petition, and Appellant agreed that Respondent's motion 
to dismiss previously filed could be deemed a response to 
the Amended Petition. At the same time, counsel for 
Respondent for the first time indicated that they would 
ask to have their motion to dismiss brought on immediately. 
By order of the Court, the entire matter was set over 
until November 30, 1978, the next day. 
Also on November 29, 1978, in hearing on the same 
calendar, a Motion for Stay was heard and granted by 
Judge Sawaya in a similar capital case, Dunsdon v. Morris, 
No. 78-7012. In that case an evidentiary hearing was 
asked for and scheduled on one of the exact issues raised 
by Appellant's Petition: the pattern of arbitrariness and 
discrimination in death sentencing under the present 
Utah law. No motion to dismiss was made in that case by 
Respondent; instead, the parties there agreed to a hearing 
on the question and set a discovery schedule pending that 
hearing. 
On November 30, 1978, the parties in this case again 
appeared before Judge Sawaya for a hearing on the motions. 
At that hearing Respondent began by arguing that the 
Petition should be dismissed because it did not raise 
"a single significant fact or case which was not known or 
should have been known . . on October the 2nd, 1978 when 
-3-
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the United States Supreme Court denied the Petition for 
Cert in this case." Trans. 11/30/78 at 4. Respondent 
urged that unless Appellant's counsel could "point out 
what significant facts and w~at significant law has 
occurred from the time that the Amended Appellant's 
Briefs were filed in the Utah Supreme Court" the Petition 
should be summarily dismissed without a hearing on its 
merits. Id. at 4-5. In response, counsel for Appellant 
sought to point out to the Court that "there are signifi-
cant new developments of fact or law which have occurred 
since the taking of the appeal in this case" which 
required a hearing. Id. at 6. Counsel cited four United 
States Supreme Court decisions, and two cases pending 
before the Court, which significantly affected the issues 
raised by these Petitions and which had never been considered 
by the Utah Courts. Id. at 6-8. Appellant's counsel further 
pointed out to the Court certain factual matters which 
could not have been presented and raised during his trial 
and direct appeal: the actual prejudicial impact on the 
jurors of publicity surrounding his case and communications 
to the jurors during trial; and the pattern of death 
sentencing that had emerged since William Andrews' trial 
which showed his sentence to have been imposed arbitrarily 
and discriminatorily. Id. at 9-12. Counsel concluded that, 
because of these new developments of law and fact which 
-4-
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could not have been injected into the direct appeal process, 
the issues raised by this Petition could not properly be 
deemed determined by dispositions in the direct appeal 
process. Ibid. Counsel specifically pointed out that the 
direct appeal process was limited to its own record (Id. at 
27), and alleged that at an evidentiary they could show 
discrimination in the application of the Utah death penalty 
law which could not have been established at any earlier 
time (Id. at 17). 
After hearing this argument, and without taking 
evidence or bringing the trial record before him, Judge 
Sawaya dismissed the Petition and denied the stay of 
execution. See Order of November 30, 1978. Three days 
later he entered findings and conclusions on that order, 
holding that "no developments of fact or law ~aterial to 
the determination of the legality or constitutlonality of 
the conviction and sentence of the Petitioner herein have 
occurred since the filing of Petitioner's direct appeal to 
the Utah Supreme Court," that "[a]ll the issues regarding 
the constitutionality of the processes for death sentencing 
under Utah law . . . and the affect of any alleged prejudicial 
publicity or influences on Petitioner's trial" were 
"raised in his direct appeal" "or could have been raised," 
and that"Petitioner's claim that Utah's death penalty law 
has been applied arbitrarily and discriminatorily fails to 
state a claim on which relief could be granted or on which 
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a hearing need be held . Findings and Conclusions 
at 1. From those rulings Appellant appealed to this Court, 
and on December 4, 1978, was granted a stay of execution 
pending this appeal. 
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ARGUt-!ENT 
POINT I 
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RULES OF THIS COURT REQUIRE 
THAT POST CONVICTION RELIEF BE AVAILABLE TO PERSONS CmJFINED 
UNDER SENTENCES IMPOSED IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSITIUTION. 
In Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965), the Supreme 
Court suggested, but did not decide, that "the Fourteenth 
Amend~ent requires that the States afford State prisoners some 
adequate corrective process for the hearing and determination 
of claims of violation of federal constitutional guarantees." 
381 U.S. at 337. Concurring Justices of the Court noted that 
its previous decisions "articulated the principle that the 
States must afford prisoners some 'clearly defined method by 
which they may raise claims of denial of federal rights.'" 
Ibid. (concurring opinion of Justice Clark) • quoting Young v. 
Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 239 (1949). They p::;~~-t-J ou':: the 
desirable attributes of a State post-
conviction procedure should reduce the 
necessity for exercise of federal habeas 
corpus jurisdiction. The procedure should 
be swift and siwple and easily invoked. 
It should be sufficiently comprehensive 
to embrace all federal constitutional 
claims. In light of Fay v. Noia, (372 
u.s. 391 (1963) .. it should eschew 
rigid and technical doctrines of . 
forfeiture waiver or default ... 1t 
should pro~ide for full fact hearings to 
resolve disputed factual issues, and for 
co~pilation of the record to_a~low federal 
courts to determine the suff1c1ency_of 
those hearings . . . it should prov1de for 
decisions supported by opinions or ~act 
findings and conclusions of law, wh1ch 
disclose the grounds of decision and the 
resolution of disputed facts. 
-6-
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case v. Nebraska, supra at 381 U.S. 346-347 (concurring 
opinion of Justice Brennan) (citations and footnotes omitted. 
The Justices emphasized that the availability of such pro-
cedures "will stop the rising conflict presently being gener-
ated between federal and state courts." Id. at 381 U.S. 340 
(Justice Clark), 344-346 (Justice Brennan). 
In 1969 this Court adopted Rule 65B(i) which provides, 
in part, that 
Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary 
or county jail under a committment of any 
court 
whether such imprisonment be under an 
original co~~ittment or under a 
committrnent for violation of probation 
or parole, who asserts that in any 
proceedings which resulted in his 
committrnent there was s substantial 
denial of his rights under the Constitution 
of the United States or of the State of 
Utah, or both, may institute a proceeding 
under this rule. 
This rule on its face creates the kind of post conviction 
relief in the state courts the Supreme Court said was 
desireable in Case. It places no conditions on the right 
to bring the action it creates, except to require that 
"All claims of the denial of any of the complainant's 
constitutional rights shall be raised in the post conviction 
proceeding brought under this rule. "URCP65B(i) (4). 
It permits the petitioned court to dismiss a complaint 
challenging the constitutionality of a committment which has 
"already been adjudged in a prior habeas corpus or other 
similar proceeding;• but makes no provision for dismissal 
on any other grounds not involving the merits of a well 
-7-
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pleaded complaint. URCP 65B(i} (2). In short, the Rule 
entitles a person confined in aleged violation of the consti-
tution to challenge his confinement through a single compre-
hensive petition raising his claimed right to be free. 
This does not mean that a prisoner may relitigate 
through post conviction proceedings the self same issues 
decided against him in his direct appeal, or that criminal 
defendants may bypass issues in appealing their convictions 
and hold them in reserve for post conviction proceedings. 
In criminal cases as in all matters, 
The rule of law is wise in that it 
gives finality to judgments and also 
conserves the time of courts, in that 
courts should not be required to 
relitigate matters which have once been 
fully and finally determined. 
Richardson v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044, 1046 
(1971). And litigants in criminal cases as in all others, 
may intentionally waive and abandon a claim of constitutional 
right, and be barred from raising it again. 
If a habeas applicant, after consultation 
with competent counsel or otherwise, 
understandingly and knowingly forewent 
the privilege of seeking to vindicate 
his federal claims in the state courts, 
whether for strategic, tactical, or any 
other reasons that could fairly be 
described as the deliberate by-passing 
of state procedures, 
he may be held to have waived his rights and precluded from 
raising them in collateral attacks. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 
( 963) But absent such a prior adjudication or 4 391 1 - • 
dclib<:oratc \·t«iver, neither the rules governing post conviction 
-8-
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1 
relief not the principle of collateral estoppel governing 
serial litigations preclude a Utah prisoner from applying for 
relief from alleged unconstitutional confinement. 
Dicta in this Court's decisions since the passage of 
Rule 65B(i) have properly emphasized "the error of attempting 
to use such a writ as a substitute for the prescribed appeal 
procedure." Rammell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108, 1109 (1977). 
But the Court has not curtailed the availability of the writ 
"where the requirements of the law have been so ignored or 
distorted that the party is substantially and effectively 
denied what is included in the term due process of law." 
Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121, 122-123 (1967). 
It has noted its awareness of the expanding concepts of due 
process and the availability of habeas corpus. (See id. at 123 
n.5) And though it has continued to caution against the use of 
habeas corpus proceedings to raise issues that could be raised 
on direct appeal, both this court and the lower courts it has 
affirmed have nonetheless reached the merits even of issues that 
clearly could have been raised on appeal where they are of con-
stitutional dimension. See, eg., Ra~mell v. Smith, supra; 
1The rule of collateral estoppel governs "situations 
like this wherein issues which are actually decided 
against a party in prior action may be relied upon 
by an opponent in a later case as having been judicially 
established." Richardson v. Hodson, supra at 485 P.2d 
1046. "The estoppel applies only to issues actually 
litigated and not to those which could have been determined." 
Ibid. 
-9-
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Horne v. Turner, 29 Utah 2d 175, 506 P.2d 1268 (1973); 
Zumbrunnen v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 428, 497 P.2d 34, 35 (1972). 
It has held that where "there has been such unfairness or 
failure to accord due process that it would be wholly unconscion-
able not to re-examine the conviction" habeas corpus will lie. 
Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528, 530 (Utah 1978). 
Appellant submits that where, as here, a man is being 
sent to die and claiming he was not given a fair trial and was 
denied his constitutional rights, it would be unconscionable not 
to examine the merit of his claims. 
Moreover, it would be unjustifiable. To hold, as the 
District Courts did in this case, that the possibility that an 
issue could have previously been raised on appeal absolutely 
and finally bars its assertion on habeas corpus, would be to 
ignore the plain provisions of URCP 65B(i), to leave prisoners 
confined in violation of constitutional rights they have not 
waived without a state remedy, and to force them into federal 
court without even a hearing in a court in Utah. No purpose 
could possibly be served by such an absolute and inflexible 
bar. The state's interest in finality of judgments is fully 
satisfied by this Court's rule permitting and requiring consti-
tutional challenges to confinement to be raised in a single post 
conviction petition. Rule 65B(i} (4). Judicial efficiency is 
protected by the rule of collateral estoppel, which forecloses 
the raising of issues previously adjudicated in a case involving 
a party raising them. See Richardson v. Hodson, supra. But 
-10-
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expansion of that rule to declare waived and bar from Utah 
courts any constitutional claim which conceivably could have 
been raised at the time of the appeal--whether or not the 
defendant there made any knowing waiver, whether or not the 
law or the facts on which the claim is based was known or 
established at the time--simply erases the remedy Rule 65B(.i) 
provides, and forces prisoners to challenge their confinement, 
ann the State to defend it, in federal court. 
The District Court here erred in failing to determine 
which of Appellant's constitutional claims were new, whether 
any of them had been waived, and which of them were based on 
new facts or law not available at the time of his direct appeal. 
Its summary dismissal of this petition, forcing Appellant out 
of the Utah courts without a hearing on the facts or la\v he 
asserts, should be reversed. 
POINT II 
A COURT CANNOT PROPERLY DETE£-!INE THAT AN ISSUE IS FORE-
CLOSED BY A PRIOR DECISION WITHOUT FINDING FACTS AND HAVING THE 
ENTIRE RECORD OF PRIOR PROCEEDINGS BEFORE IT. 
Rule 65B(i) (7) requires that prior to a hearing on a 
post conviction relief petition, "the State or County shall 
obtain such transcript of proceedings or court records as may 
be relevant or material to the case." In order to make a deter-
mination that the raising of an issue is foreclosed by the doc-
trine of res judicata, a trial court must have the entire record 
of the prior proceeding before it. See Parris v. La,-tnnCity corP· 
-11-
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542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975). Such reference to the prior record 
is necessary because a determination that a matter is foreclosed 
by a prior decision requires a determination of fact; it cannot 
be made from the face of the pleadings before the court. For 
that reason, a motion claiming that one lawsuit should be dismissed 
because it is barred by the decision in another is not a motion 
under URCP 12 (b) ·but a matter for summary judgment under Rule 
56 since it requires examination of materials and facts beyond 
the pleadings. See Vance v. Heath, 42 Utah 148, 129 P. 365 (1912); 
Escalante Co. v. Kent, 79 Utah 26, 7 P.2d 276 (1932). Those 
matters must include the entire record of the prior proceeding, 
so that it can be determined exactly what was in fact decided 
there. Parrish v. Layton City Corp., supra. 
Habeas corpus proceedings are civil, and are governed 
by the rules of civil procedure in Utah. URCP 65B(i) (6). It 
is one of the most basic rules of civil F~~~~lce that, when a 
motion to dismiss raises "matters outslde : .. co <=~eading 
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and 
disposed of as provided in Rule 56." URCP 12(b) (6). It is 
error to deny the parties the opportunity to fully present 
evidence and contest the factual allegations on which the 
motion is based. 
Str-.:1nd v. 
It is error to consider a motion_to 
dismiss as a motion for summary JUdgment 
without giving the adverse ~arty an . 
opporutnity to present pert~nent mater1al. 
Associated Students of Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 
It l·s error for a trial court to convert a 193 (Uteth 1977) · 
rnotion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment or to 
-12-
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require the plaintiff to state "how he will establish his 
claim . Hill v. Grand Central Inc. 25 Utah 2d 121, 
477 P.2d 150, 151 (1970); see Harvey v. s.mders, 534 P.2d 
905 (Utah 1975); Beacons Bar V Ranch v. Utah Farm Productions, 
587 P.2d 151 (Utah 1978). And it is clear error for a 
court to make a factual determination concluding a case 
without having the pertinent evidentiary materials before it. 
In this case the District Court made all these errors. 
It rejected that Appellant's specific allegation that the 
death penalty was being imposed on him for reasons not 
permissible under the Constitution (Trans. ll/30/78 at 28) 
and that the death penalty was being administered 
"arbitrarily and discriminatorily against the poor and 
outcast whose alleged victims are white" (Petition at 8), 
without conducting any evidentiary inquiry into whether 
those allegations were true. It held that Appellant could 
and should have proven at his trial or on his direct appeal 
that the jury in his case was actually affected and 
prejudiced by improper outside influences, without examining 
the record to see whether, as he claimed, it was impossible 
for him to establish those facts at trial. See Trans. 
ll/30/78 at 9. It accepted representations by counsel 
regarding the significance of the verdicts at trial (see 
Id. at 22) without looking into the whole record to 
determine whether, in fact, those verdicts had that 
significance. And it ruled that substantial claims of 
-13-
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constitutional rights violations were not available to 
Appellant, without determining from any record whether he 
had personally waived them or whether his counsel had in 
any previous proceeding been afforded the opportunity to 
assert them. 
The kind of dismissal that the District Court 
entered in this case is specifically reserved by the rules 
of civil procedure for pleadings which on their face fail 
to state a cause of action. A ruling that necessarily 
goes beyond the face of the pleadings cannot be made in 
the manner in which the District Court acted. 
Parties bringing a lawsuit proper on its face are 
entitled to an opportunity to present these necessary 
materials and arguments to the court before their case is 
dismissed. The District Court afforded Appel~ant no 
opportunity to present his evidence and ~- ~:·~~='· 
Accordingly, the determinations made by the District Court 
were factually and legally wrong, both in the manner it 
reached them and in the result reached. 
14 
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POINT III 
NEW DEVELOPMENTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW WHICH ARE RETRO-
ACTIVE TO PRIOR CASES CAN PROPERLY PROVIDE THE BASIS 
FOR HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF. 
The position of the Respondent State of Utah below 
was that new constitutional claims may not be raised on 
habeas corpus unless "new issues of law or fact arise 
that were not known at the time of appeal." Memorandum 
in Support of Motion to Dismiss Amended Petition at 9. 
There was no dispute about the standard under existing 
Utah law. Trans. 11/30/78 at 6. One of the essential 
functions of the modern Writ is to raise newly emerged 
constitutional issues after the opportunity to raise 
them on appeal has passed. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 
391 (1963). A mere failure to raise a point established 
by constitutional case law in an appeal cannot foreclose 
later reliance on that case law, unless the failure 
constitutes a waiver or the law is new and non-retroactive. 
"[W]aiver affecting federal rights is a federal 
question," Fay v. Noia, supra at 372 U.S. 439, and under 
that law a constitutional waiver must be"an intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or 
privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
A right not yet established by controlling case law can 
hardly be deemed "known" or "abandoned intentionally" by 
a lawyer's failure to foresee it. The course of 
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constitutional decision making seldom runs smooth, and 
its forks and turns are seldom easy to anticipate. 
Especially in the death penalty area "[t)he signals 
from [the Supreme) Court have not . . always been easy 
to decipher," and the Court's decisions have "engendered 
confusion as to what was required in order to impose 
the death penalty in accord with the Eighth Amendment." 
Lockett v. Ohio, U.S. ___ , 57 L.Ed.2d 973, 986-988, 
98 S.Ct. 2954 (1978). Counsel can hardly fairly be 
deemed to have "intentionally" waived constitutional 
issues in this area by not mentioning them before they 
are recognized by the Courts. Moreover, even if counsel 
could be held so accountable, a defendant himself cannot--
and a federal constitutional waiver must be a personal 
one. "A choice made by counsel not parti~ipated in by 
the Petitioner does not automaticall; na- ~~,, in 
later proceedings. Fay v. Noia, supra at 372 U.S. 439. 
A constitutional claim not waived should be 
available in any case to which it applies, unless that 
case arose before the principle was announced and the 
principle is declared non-retroactive. The District 
Court's decision in this case in effect held that the new 
constitutional case law on which Appellant was relying 
was not retroactive to cases past the stage of direct appeal. 
But retroactivity of new constitutional decisions is itself 
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a matter of federal law to be determined by considering the 
nature of the right involved, policies affected by its 
enforcement, and the stage of the proceedings at which it 
is invoked. See Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 
241-243 (1977). Where, as here, the constitutional doctrine 
announced touches the "truth-finding function" rather 
than some evidentiary rule aimed at influencing actions in 
future cases, it presumably is retroactive. Ibid. The 
District Court here gave no reason why the decisions 
Appellant cited should not be considered retroactive to 
his case, and indeed apparently did not even examine them. 
Its summary rejection of new law that could not have been 
injected into this case at any earlier stage was error. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT'S CLAIMS THAT THE UTAH DEATH PENALTY LAWS ARE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON THEIR FACE WERE BASED ON NEW 
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS WHICH ARE APPLICABLE HERE. 
In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) and its 
companion cases, the Supreme Court upheld three death 
penalty statutes, struck down two, and emphasized that 
the constitutionality of "each distinct system must be 
examined on an individual basis." 428 U.S. at 195. In 
State v. Pierre,572 P.2d 1338, 1356 (Utah 1977) this 
Court "acknowledge[d] that Utah's system, applicable to 
defendant, differs in some respects from those systems in 
-17-
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Georgia, Florida and Texas In Gilmore v. Utah, 
, 97 S.Ct. 436 (1976) though the Court did u.s. 
not reach the substantive issue, three Supreme Court 
Justices expressed "obvious, serious doubts about the 
validity of the [Utah] state statute" and a fourth deemed 
them "not insubstantial". 97 s.ct. at 439 (dissenting 
opinions of Justices White, Brennan and Marshall), 440 
(dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun). In the two 
years after Gilmore and after this Court heard argument 
on these issues, the Supreme Court issued several further 
capital punishments decisions which underscored the 
reasons for those doubts. 
In Gregg v. Georgia, and its companion cases, the 
Supreme Court upheld three statutes that provided elaborate. 
procedures to guard against the arbitrar~~2=s and discrim-
ination in death sentencing that Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S. 238 {1972) had condemned. All three of the statutory 
systems which Gregg cases unheld provided for bifurcated 
trials on guilt and sentence. In the sentencing proceeding 
under each statute, the State was required to specifically 
allege one or more "aggravating" facts which the law 
specifically delineated, and which the State contended 
justified imposition of the death penalty. Under each 
system the sentencing judge or jury had to find one or 
more of these facts established--in addition to the facts 
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which it had found in determining guilt--and to specify 
the particular facts it found true in rendering a death 
verdict. "Aggravating" factors other than those listed 
by statute could not support a sentence of death. Appellate 
review of specific "aggravating" factors found was provided 
to insure that the sentence was both legal and in 
proportion to the crime. See Gregg v. Georgia, supra at 
428 U.S. 196-212; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 269-274 (1976); 
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 249-253 (1976). 
Supreme Court decisions since Gregg have highlighted 
the importance of each of these features of the statutes 
to their constitutional validity. In (Harry) Roberts v. 
Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977), a clear majority of the 
Court held squarely that mere narrowing of the definition 
of a capital crime is not enough to satisfy Furman where 
adequate safeguards against jury arbitrariness are not 
provided as well. In Gardner v. Florida, 430 u.s. 349 (1977) 
the Court re-emphasized the critical importance of 
procedural safeguards at the sentencing stage. Gardner 
held that, because "death is a different kind of punishment 
than any other which may be imposed in this country," a 
death sentencing proceeding must satisfy the highest 
"standards of procedural fairness" so that "any decision 
to impose the death sentence [will) be, and appear to be, 
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based on reason rather than caprice and emotion." 430 U.S. 
at 358 ; see Id. at 430 U.S. 363 (concurring opinion of 
Justice White). Specifically, Gardner invalidated the use 
of secret information in capital sentencing which permitted 
sentences to be imposed without the defendant having notice 
of the specific allegations and the opportunity to contest 
them, and without the sentencing authority making specific 
findings to "disclose to the reviewing court the consider-
ations which motivated the death sentence .... " Id. at 
430 u.s. 361. Gardner stands for the proposition that a 
system that permits the death sentence to be imposed 
without giving open and specific and consistent reasons 
cannot be sustained. That holding was adhered to even more 
recently in Presnell v. Georgia, u.s. I 58 L.Ed.2d 
207 (1978) where the Court overturned a Georgia death 
sentence affirmed by the Georgia Supreme Court on aggravating 
factors other than those specified in the jury verdict, 
because such inconsistencies violated the kind of 
"fundamental principles of procedural fairness . at 
the penalty phase of a trial in a capital case" announced 
in Gardner. 58 L.Ed.2d at 211. 
Appellant's trial, and the Utah procedures under which 
it was conducted, did not meet the standards set down by 
these cases. Though the hearing was bifurcated on trial 
and sentencing, no factual findings were required at the 
-20 
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sentencing phase; as in (Harry) Roberts and Woodson v. 
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) the jury, having 
convicted, was free to impose a death or life sentence 
for reasons wholly outside those recognized by law. Cf. 
Woodson v. North Carolina, supra at 428 U.S. 302-303 
Like the Petitioner in Gardner v. Florida, supra, Appellant 
was given no notice by statute or information of the 
specific grounds on which a death sentence would be sought 
or could be based, and no such ground was ever specified 
by the sentencing authority. It is thus fully possible 
that, like the Georgia Supreme Court in Presnell, this 
Court's affirmance of Appellant's sentence on direct 
appeal (see State v. Andrews, supra at 574 P.2d 711) was 
based on reasons different from those which the jury found 
determinative in making its decision. Not even the most 
basic due process notions, let alone the extraordinary 
standards established by Gardner, are met by a system which 
places no limit on the issues to be considered, requires no 
pleading or proof of them beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
makes no open finding of reasons for imposition of the 
most extreme penalty. 
These, briefly, were Appellant's claims against the 
constitutionality of Utah death sentencing procedur~s in 
his Petition below. See Amended Petition at 4-8. In 
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addition, the Petition contended that the particular 
sentence imposed on William Andrews, "who has never been 
alleged nor proven or found by any court or jury to have 
personally taken life or intended to take life, is 
constitutionally cruel and disproportionate to the crime 
Id. at 9. This claim was drawn from another 
recent Supreme Court decision, that in Lockett v. Ohio, 
supra. In Lockett, a concurring opinion neces-
sary to the decision of the majority held that "[b)ecause 
it has been extremely rare that the death penalty has 
been imposed upon those who were not found to have 
intended the death of the victim" or "who did not personally 
commit the nurder," 
it violates the Eighth Amendment to impose 
the penalty of death without a finding that 
the defendant possessed a purpose to ca~se 
the death of the victim. 
57 L. Ed. 2d at 1002. Similarly, Appellant's Petition 
alleged that the method of execution used in this State 
"constitutes the purposeless infliction of pain through 
means inconsistent with the evolving standards of decency 
in the United States." Amended Petition at 9. This claim 
was based on the Eighth Amendment rules of Coker v. Georgia, 
433 U.S. 584 (1977), which held that 
the Eighth Amendment bars not only those 
punishments that are "barbaric" but also those 
that are "excessive" . . . [A) punishment is 
"excessive" and unconstitutional if it (l) makes 
no measurable contribution to acceptable goals 
of punishment and hence is nothing more t~an the 
purposelcs3 i~position of paln and suffer1ng, .or 
(2) is grossly out of proportlon to the sever1ty 
of the crime. 
-22 
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433 u.s. 592. Coker struck down the death penalty for rape 
in part because that penalty had been rejected as too ex-
treme by all states but Georgia, and had extremely rarely 
been carried out in modern times anywhere. 433 U.S. 596-597. 
In Lockett, Justice White followed Coker's principles and 
based his decision that death must be reserved for intentional 
killings partly on the fact that the death penalty applied 
to unintended crimes "fails to significantly contribute to 
acceptable, or, indeed,any perceptible goals of punishment." 
57 L. Ed. 2d at 1002-1003. Had Appellant been given the 
hearing he requested on his claim against the method of 
execution here (see Amended Petition at 9-10), he would 
have sought to prove that execution by firing squad has 
been rejected by all jurisdictions save Utah, and constitutes 
the ''purposeless imposition of pain and suffering" which 
serves no penal purpose but to satisfy certain doctrines 
of the Mormon Church. Such a showing would clearly have 
brought his claim within the Eighth Amendment rules of Coker. 
These new issues of law significantly affect the 
constitutionality of the sentence imposed on Appellant 
William Andrews. They should be considered by the Utah 
courts before the validity of that sentence is finally passed 
upon. The District Court should have considered them before 
holding that the sentence had been conclusively upheld. 
This Court should remand this case so that the courts can 
consider them now. 
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POINT V 
A CLAIM THAT A PERSON HAS BEEN SENTENCED TO DEATH AS A 
RESULT OF RACIAL DISCRH!INATION CANNOT BE DISMISSED AS A 
MATTER OF LAI-J WITHOUT AN INQUIRY TO DETERMINE IF THAT 
CLAIM IS TRUE. 
The one issue raised by Appellant's Petition on which 
the District Court reached the merits was the contention 
that the death penalty is being imposed in Utah and in the 
United States "rarely and arbitrarily and discriminatorily 
against the poor and outcast whose alleged victims are 
white," and almost exclusively in cases where the defendant 
"is non-white, male, poor, and a stranger in the community 
in "'hich he was tried." Amended Petition at 8-9. The 
District Court ruled that this portion of the Petition 
"fails to state a claim on which relief could be granted or 
on which a hearing need be held . • 2 Find~ngs and 
Conclusions at 1. The Court thus held, i~ E~~er~, that 
Appellant was entitled to no relief whether or not his life 
was being taken by the State, as he alleged, arbitrarily and 
as the result of racial discrimination. 
2 Judge Sawaya added in his written findings that "Petitioner 
could & should have raised such issue on direct appeal" (Ibid.) 
but it is clear that this alternative was not the basis of his 
holding. It was undisputed that the two petitioners before 
the Court were the first persons sentenced to death under the 
Utah law, and that they had had no prior opportunity to offer 
evidence of discrimination in the appeal process. Trans. 
11/30/78 at 11, 29-30. Judge Sawaya recognized this and 
acknowledged that he "took the position that even though it was 
not ar1 issue that was or could have been raised at the time of 
direct appeal, that it was not an issue which had any merit." 
Trans. of n0 aring l2/l5/78 at 6, Codianna v. Morris, Utah Sup. 
Ct.t,!o. 16187. 
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The District Court made its rulings despite the fact 
that the Petitioners before him clearly argued that the 
death sentenced here were imposed "because of race and 
because of arbitrary and capricious powers exercised by 
prosecutors," and alluded to evidence they could offer to 
support that claim. Trans. ll/30/78 at 17. It heard 
neither this evidence nor legal argument from the Petitioners 
in support. Instead, it apparently relied on the Respondent's 
arguments that there could be no constitutional challenge 
to "prosecutorial discretion in charging a capital felony" 
(Memo. Supporting Motion to Dismiss at 6), though Petitioners 
made it clear that 
We are not limiting our allegations to 
pr~secutorial discretion but we are looking, 
as ~he Court did in Furman, at the whole 
system. People that go into it on capital 
charges or potentially capital charges and 
t~e people that come out with death sentences, 
we are saying that there is no rhyme or reason 
or, if there is any rhyme or reason, they are 
reasons that are not permissible under the 
Constitution of the United States. 
Trans. 11/30/78 at 28. Clearly, those allegations stated a 
claim on which relief could and, if they were proven, would 
have to be granted. 
It is long since settled that the Constitution forbids 
the discriminatory enforcement of a facially valid statute. 
Though the law itself may be fair on its 
face and impartial in appearance, yet, if 
it is applied and administered by public 
authority with an evil eye and an unequal 
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hand, so as practically to make unjust an 
illegal discriroinations between persons 
in similar circumstances material to their 
rights, denial of equal justice is still 
within the prohibition of the constitution. 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-374 (1886}. For the 
hundred years since that was decided it has been accepted 
that a person penalized as part of a pattern of discrimina~ 
tory law enforcement was entitled to judicial relief. See, 
e.g., Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935}; Shuttlesworth 
v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969}; Allee v. Madrano. 416 
u.s. 802 (1974). 
In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 236 (1972}, the Supreme 
Court held that the imposition and carrying out of the death 
penalty u~ier sentencing systems then in force violated the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments--because under those systems 
"the penalty was being imposed discriminatorily, wantonly 
and freakis~ly, and so infrequently that any given death 
sentence was cruel and unusual." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153, 220-221 (1976). The Furman majority was made up of 
five separate opinions; but at the core of each of them was 
this principle: 
The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot 
tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death 
under legal systems that permit this unique 
penalty to be wantonly and . . freakishly 
imposed. 
Icl. ~08 u.s. at 310 (concurring opinion of t-1r. Justice Stewart; 
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the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments are violated if 
the death penalty is exacted with great 
infrequency even for the most atrocious 
crimes and . . there is no meaningful 
basis for distinguishing the few cases 
in which it is imposed from any cases in 
which it is not. 
Id. at 408 U.S. 313 (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice White). 
Furman therefore stands for the proposition that the arbitrary 
and capricious application of the death penalty violates the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments--and its prohibition extends 
to any form of "arbitrary and capricious exercise" of "the 
power to determine which first-degree murderers shall live 
and which shall die." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 
303 (1976) (plurality opinion). "The basic concern of Furman 
centered on tr,r;se defendants who are being condemned to death 
capriciously and arbitrarily." Id. at 428 U.S. 303 (concurrinc 
opinions of Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens). To explore 
that concern the Court there looked to the actual pattern of 
imposition of the sentence of death under the statutes it was 
examining. See Furman v. Georgia, supra at 408 U.S. 256-257 
(concurring opinion of Justice Brennan), 309-310 (concurring 
opinion of Justice Stewart), 311-314 (concurring opinion of 
Justice White). 
The generalities of the law inflicting 
capital punishment is one thing. b'hat 
may be said o~ the validity of a law on 
the books and \'lhat may be ,:one with the 
law in its application do or may lead to 
quite different conclusions. 
Id.at 408 U.S. 242 (concurring opinion o£ Justice Douglas). 
-27-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In Gregg v. Georgia, supra, and several companion 
cases, the Supreme Court affirmed the validity of three 
of five capital sentencing statutes before it "on their 
face . Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251 (1976). 
(plurality opinion). To the extent the Court examined the 
actual administration of the death penalty under those statut~s, 
it found nothing in the records before it to support any 
claim or arbitrariness and discrimination in fact. See Gregg 
v. Georgia, supra at 428 U.S. 222, 224, 225; Jurek v. Texas, 
428 U.S. 262, 279 (1976). The Court explicitly stated it 
could not consider claims of arbitrariness "unsupported by 
any facts," or assume other than proper actions or motives 
"absent facts to the contrary . Gregg v. Georgia, 
supra at 428 U.S. 225 (plurality opinion). Furman's 
essential ci7tate that death sentences could not constitu-
tionally be dispensed in an arbitrary, rare and uneven fashion 
under any kind of sentencing system thus clearly survived 
Gregg. See Woodson v. North Carolina, supra at 428 U.S. 302-
303. Appellant's claim here was that this dictate had been 
violated under this Utah law and in his case. 
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
cannot be granted unless it appears to a certainty that the 
claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of 
facts that could be proven in support of his claim. Liquor 
Control Co~~- v. Athas, 121 Utah 457, 243 P.2d 441, 443 (1952). 
Clearly, under Furman, and under the most basic law of equal 
protection, proof of the fact that a person's life is being 
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taken as part of a pattern of discriminatory deprivation of 
life on the basis of race would entitle that person to 
relief. Appellant has alleged and does allege that his life 
is being taken in this manner--that because he is black and 
his victims were white, because he is an outsider and his 
victims were Utah residents, because he was poor and his 
victims were prominent he has been condemned to die where 
others convicted of crimes of similar gravity but not 
sharing his disadvantages were not. See Trans. 11/30/78 at 
17-18; Amended Petition at 8-9. Such allegations assert 
the most fundamental kind of equal protection violation. 
Under no constitutional theory can they be dismissed as a 
matter of 12''-'. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons the District Court's 
Order dismissing the Petition in this case and denying a 
stay of execution, should be reversed and the case should 
be remanded for the full briefing and evidentiary hearing 
to which Petitioner was entitled. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~
_"')Q_ 
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